Network Working Group                                 P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                      ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational                              28 June 2023
Expires: 30 December 2023


            Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
                    draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12

Abstract

   The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
   infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
   credential data between multiple user devices.  The core protocols of
   the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
   reference data.

   [Note to Readers]

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
   (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.

   This document is also available online at
   http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 December 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Related Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Accounts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.1.  Activation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.2.  Connection Assertion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.3.  Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   4.  Catalogs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.1.  Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.1.1.  Access Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       4.1.2.  Null Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       4.1.3.  Cryptographic Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       4.1.4.  Publication Capability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     4.2.  Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       4.2.1.  Mail  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       4.2.2.  SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     4.3.  Bookmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     4.4.  Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     4.5.  Credential  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     4.6.  Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     4.7.  Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     4.8.  Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     4.9.  Task  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   5.  Spools  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     5.1.  Outbound  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     5.2.  Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     5.3.  Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     5.4.  Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   6.  Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   7.  Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     7.1.  Key Derivation from Seed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     7.2.  Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.  . . . . . . .  46
     7.3.  Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     7.4.  EARL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   8.  Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49



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     8.1.  Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     8.2.  Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     8.3.  Mesh Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     8.4.  Device Pre-configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   9.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     9.1.  Mesh Account  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       9.1.1.  Account Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     9.2.  Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       9.2.1.  The Device Catalog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       9.2.2.  Mesh Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     9.3.  Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     9.4.  Mesh Messaging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       9.4.1.  Message Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       9.4.2.  Four Corner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       9.4.3.  Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   10. Publications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     10.1.  Profile Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     10.2.  Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   11. Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     11.1.  Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       11.1.1.  Classes describing keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       11.1.2.  Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       11.1.3.  Structure: KeyShare  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       11.1.4.  Structure: CompositePrivate  . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     11.2.  Assertion classes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       11.2.1.  Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       11.2.2.  Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.3.  Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.4.  Structure: Activation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.5.  Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.6.  Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.7.  Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       11.2.8.  Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       11.2.9.  Structure: ProfileAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       11.2.10. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       11.2.11. Structure: ProfileGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       11.2.12. Structure: ProfileService  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       11.2.13. Structure: ProfileMeshService  . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       11.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       11.2.15. Connection Assertions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       11.2.16. Structure: Connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       11.2.17. Structure: CallsignBinding . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       11.2.18. Structure: Accreditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       11.2.19. Structure: ConnectionStripped  . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       11.2.20. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       11.2.21. Structure: ConnectionDevice  . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       11.2.22. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . .  69
       11.2.23. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69



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       11.2.24. Structure: AccountHostAssignment . . . . . . . . . .  69
       11.2.25. Structure: ConnectionHost  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       11.2.26. Activation Assertions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       11.2.27. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       11.2.28. Structure: ActivationHost  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       11.2.29. Structure: ActivationCommon  . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       11.2.30. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . .  71
       11.2.31. Structure: ActivationApplicationSsh  . . . . . . . .  71
       11.2.32. Structure: ActivationApplicationMail . . . . . . . .  71
       11.2.33. Structure: ActivationApplicationGroup  . . . . . . .  71
     11.3.  Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       11.3.1.  Structure: ApplicationEntry  . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       11.3.2.  Structure: ApplicationEntrySsh . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       11.3.3.  Structure: ApplicationEntryGroup . . . . . . . . . .  72
       11.3.4.  Structure: ApplicationEntryMail  . . . . . . . . . .  72
     11.4.  Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       11.4.1.  Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       11.4.2.  Structure: Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.3.  Structure: TaggedSource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.4.  Structure: ContactGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.5.  Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.6.  Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.7.  Structure: OrganizationName  . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
       11.4.8.  Structure: PersonName  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
       11.4.9.  Structure: NetworkAddress  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
       11.4.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       11.4.11. Structure: Role  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       11.4.12. Structure: Location  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       11.4.13. Structure: Bookmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       11.4.14. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       11.4.15. Structure: Engagement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
     11.5.  Catalog Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
       11.5.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
       11.5.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
       11.5.3.  Structure: CatalogedSignature  . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       11.5.4.  Structure: CatalogedPublication  . . . . . . . . . .  77
       11.5.5.  Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . .  78
       11.5.6.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationSsh . . . . . . . . .  78
       11.5.7.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork  . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
       11.5.8.  Structure: CatalogedContact  . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
       11.5.9.  Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
       11.5.10. Structure: Capability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
       11.5.11. Structure: NullCapability  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
       11.5.12. Structure: AccessCapability  . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
       11.5.13. Structure: PublicationCapability . . . . . . . . . .  80
       11.5.14. Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . .  80
       11.5.15. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
       11.5.16. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial  . . . . . . . .  80



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       11.5.17. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . .  80
       11.5.18. Structure: CapabilitySign  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
       11.5.19. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . .  81
       11.5.20. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange  . . . . . . . . .  81
       11.5.21. Structure: NamedService  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
       11.5.22. Structure: ServiceAccessToken  . . . . . . . . . . .  81
       11.5.23. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       11.5.24. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       11.5.25. Structure: CatalogedApplication  . . . . . . . . . .  82
       11.5.26. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       11.5.27. Structure: CatalogedGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       11.5.28. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail  . . . . . . . .  83
       11.5.29. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . .  83
       11.5.30. Structure: MessageInvoice  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       11.5.31. Structure: CatalogedReceipt  . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       11.5.32. Structure: CatalogedTicket . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     11.6.  Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
       11.6.1.  Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPublic  . . . . . .  84
       11.6.2.  Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPrivate . . . . . .  84
     11.7.  Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
       11.7.1.  Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
       11.7.2.  Structure: MessageError  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       11.7.3.  Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       11.7.4.  Structure: MessageValidated  . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       11.7.5.  Structure: MessagePin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       11.7.6.  Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
       11.7.7.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . .  86
       11.7.8.  Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
       11.7.9.  Structure: MessageContact  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
       11.7.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation  . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.14. Structure: MessageClaim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.15. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
       11.7.16. Structure: ProcessResultNotSupported . . . . . . . .  88
       11.7.17. Structure: ProcessResultNotFound . . . . . . . . . .  88
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   14. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   15. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   16. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89









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1.  Introduction

   This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh
   with illustrative examples.  For an overview of the Mesh objectives
   and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].  For information on the
   implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying
   _Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]

   This document has two main sections.  The first section presents
   examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entries and messages and
   their use.  The second section contains the schema reference.  All
   the material in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference
   implementation [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].

   Although some of the services described in this document could be
   used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP,
   the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of
   the audience it allows them to communicate with.  Thus, while the
   Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable
   transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple
   terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to
   applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols
   if at all.

2.  Definitions

   This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
   terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
   terms used as requirements language.

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.2.  Defined Terms

   The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
   Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

2.3.  Related Specifications

   The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
   Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].  The Mesh
   documentation set and related specifications are described in this
   document.



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2.4.  Implementation Status

   The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
   the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].

3.  Actors

   The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors:
   *Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*.

   Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which
   belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to
   share access to confidential information between a group of users.
   It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to
   eliminate the distinction entirely.  When active a Mesh account is
   bound to a Mesh Service.  The service to which an account is bound
   MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single
   service at a time.

   A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is
   instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device.
   Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of
   cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices
   connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the
   account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current
   Mesh Service.  A user's Mesh accounts and the devices connected to
   them constitute that user's Personal Mesh.

   A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or
   more physical machines called Hosts.  A Mesh Host is a device that is
   attached to a service rather than an account.

3.1.  Accounts

   A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile
   Account and contains a set of Mesh stores.  Currently two account
   profiles are defined:

   ProfileUser  Describes a user account.

   ProfileGroup  Describes a group account used to share confidential
      information between a group of users.

   Both types of profile specify the following fields:

   ProfileSignature  The public signature key used to authenticate the
      profile itself




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   AccountAddress  The account name to which the account is currently
      bound. (e.g. alice@example.com, @alice).

   ServiceUdf  If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of
      the service profile to which the account is currently bound.

   AdministratorSignature  The public signature key used to verify
      administrative actions on the account.  In particular addition of
      devices to a user account or members to a group account.

   AccountEncryption  The public encryption key for the account.  All
      messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key.  By
      definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted
      under this key.

   User accounts specify two additional public keys, AccountSignature
   and AccountAuthentication which allow signature and authentication
   operations under the account context.

   Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed
   by the service as directed by the contents of the associated Access
   catalog.

   For example, the personal account profile Alice created in

   For example, Alice creates a personal account:

   Alice> meshman account create alice@example.com
   Account=alice@example.com
   UDF=MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2

   The account profile created is:



















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   {
     "ProfileUser":{
       "CommonSignature":{
         "Udf":"MDE2-MKMI-773P-GJ3F-YYAI-UVCK-OMKS",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"jR9urPbosloSRu58lkKG9O4L5BNzqbEs3oq8IzwLqU2Qy
     GRk8kWDok6OOwhYOcRgXeot_eVOAGmA"}}},
       "AccountAddress":"alice@example.com",
       "ServiceUdf":"MD3E-FN6W-3G45-YQ43-QXYR-CU4X-RKG5",
       "EscrowEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MBSK-2Y6G-DK6P-T6TU-OSLD-GCFW-MPHG",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"R5W0TYUycEMhGuxGuCkBTMYB1MgKZ036y052XLVbMsjxg
     g9iDD-yVYVNe_yUCm8QGtpSt_8Eb3cA"}}},
       "AdministratorSignature":{
         "Udf":"MBL5-JSN3-V56Q-4ULY-GY7X-GM3V-KVPZ",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"Zc5n9q482E5RuHsJ4edWsr75axwzR3mWbm5T5lfnBTRIA
     icaGPogbqa54ySA7sWjh490xrvrEyaA"}}},
       "CommonEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MBUF-P7S2-WFEF-D3ML-OKCC-XYOT-6SLD",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"8ShFcmNz5BW9nGObu7_tUZD5hm5anS7Tar53RXDcg5ayi
     Ppb7L8zVC1ljjJeAu-hk9TUNuyXE7sA"}}},
       "CommonAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MDYQ-JQB2-3EOC-N4ZD-FBJE-H3IY-WM6V",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"2zPl10qnzpGH_1idDFaVMyEymEf6ZmhMtzpmlGfZHZ2si
     FC0SHI4wamghsYS3hFL_qX6mO-SQQuA"}}},
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"or2X-rP0taTX66FxY68RR4R7Gfg3r6-MIc33QeEgU1wKi
     _HVKyiBnKDXZEexYtEC2ZH7CNqUC2QA"}}}}}





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3.2.  Device

   Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that
   device.  These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed
   from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device.
   If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be
   bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported
   without substantial effort.

   The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are
   specified in a ProfileDevice.  This MUST contain at least the
   following fields:

   ProfileSignature  The public signature key used to authenticate the
      profile itself.

   Encryption  Public encryption key used as a share contribution to
      generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of
      an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to
      an account.

   Authentication  Public authentication key used as a share
      contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be
      used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device
      to a service during the process of connecting to an account.

   Signature  Public signature key used as a share contribution to
      generation of device signature keys to be used in the context of
      an account.

   For example, the device profile corresponding to one of the devices
   belonging to Alice is:



















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   {
     "ProfileDevice":{
       "Encryption":{
         "Udf":"MCFX-IUBA-KOCW-3FUS-23Z5-NR5U-YOLN",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"BfwkRznFA0S1VirR_017VY-2B3mX8Nf_0tr5okyfLAwV0
     BgMta5eovZBEWl93_9S4VpbjOYU3cMA"}}},
       "Signature":{
         "Udf":"MCGI-AARY-CKX6-OTD6-XLON-JIZK-HGE5",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"Bz5Ze08Ub_2VY7hwZy3fa_Gw6xsDaUMKxg9h3sX_cimQf
     hUWoi5Q4wC3QYPxEomeUfxy_q8YHdkA"}}},
       "Authentication":{
         "Udf":"MCRL-42BN-TYVI-BDGP-K2NJ-OGNI-QEA3",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"Ezrv7Ku8k3odatUvfln__4zTYH9T8Ch-OP7H3MZMtRxjn
     iHBS-m8UsKGYYZUKqxXeB6lLa4_sHGA"}}},
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MBYI-QYCM-JXEY-OJ5D-4OW2-RPIR-SHUM",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"zuSuZB2gaW_FEdWSromPIOcqY9eYHC7Zp-MA-t4zBRWCX
     52UaLTUkDaOAEz18whmatsdZ9S7lFmA"}}}}}

3.2.1.  Activation

   The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic
   operations during the process of connecting a device to an account.
   During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is
   used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by
   combining the base key held by the device with a second device
   private key provided by the administration device approving the
   connection of the device to the account.  The resulting key is
   referred to as the device key.  The process of combining the base
   keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called
   Activation.

   For example, Alice connects the device whose profile is shown above
   to her account:





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   Alice2> meshman device complete
      Device UDF = MBYI-QYCM-JXEY-OJ5D-4OW2-RPIR-SHUM
      Account = alice@example.com
      Account UDF = MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2

   The activation record granting the device rights to operate as a part
   of the account is:

   {
     "ActivationAccount":{
       "AccountUdf":"MBYI-QYCM-JXEY-OJ5D-4OW2-RPIR-SHUM",
       "ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-GK4M-VGOY-6ZKY-O4GL-PR4C-VLDX-2REE-JWKT-U
   Z4P-WURR-AU5I-7643-GZKJ"}}

   And:

   {
     "ActivationCommon":{
       "Encryption":{
         "Udf":"MBUF-P7S2-WFEF-D3ML-OKCC-XYOT-6SLD",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"8ShFcmNz5BW9nGObu7_tUZD5hm5anS7Tar53RXDcg5ayi
     Ppb7L8zVC1ljjJeAu-hk9TUNuyXE7sA"}},
         "PrivateParameters":{
           "PrivateKeyECDH":{
             "Private":"sVRiHsLzUyNdLATaeG3d75Lb7vzWwse3uruhJC0Ndmmr
     KlM5wMcrq1EWUpb5rwZm2jc65olD628",
             "crv":"X448"}}},
       "Authentication":{
         "Udf":"MDYQ-JQB2-3EOC-N4ZD-FBJE-H3IY-WM6V",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"2zPl10qnzpGH_1idDFaVMyEymEf6ZmhMtzpmlGfZHZ2si
     FC0SHI4wamghsYS3hFL_qX6mO-SQQuA"}},
         "PrivateParameters":{
           "PrivateKeyECDH":{
             "Private":"iiKAixqSrf-v04PvRp3dTfr7rFU11ndEQdwP_FoXtrJ3
     CxLrBF9t_28p7smWM97Glrom4KuhaWA",
             "crv":"X448"}}},
       "Signature":{
         "Udf":"MDE2-MKMI-773P-GJ3F-YYAI-UVCK-OMKS",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"jR9urPbosloSRu58lkKG9O4L5BNzqbEs3oq8IzwLqU2Qy



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     GRk8kWDok6OOwhYOcRgXeot_eVOAGmA"}},
         "PrivateParameters":{
           "PrivateKeyECDH":{
             "Private":"uZPrQk8XtRKRHxDaOFDimB7kWcpsDjgV2Zx2SVlwpmZc
     7wmVPWnScBmVkMyGJFNelgRCTAYANtI",
             "crv":"Ed448"}}},
       "Entries":[{
           "Resource":"Contact",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MCE3-MLLT-AICU-MQBL-ZQJ5-TBT4-A7AE",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"pm2dwPeH2FR2wtt7mK5PGPquXtRh4qUJKNPbrkPZf
     uJ709z-EQ9iBF2GOViCoOtySu6ILRuzvx6A"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"4A8VYsoBNKkzLp_clmuXSKo37DjSVu7C_jO-vTj-
     k9-NU9eYBz3zt9S9DZcsXVGms16qtwF1ZG0",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Publication",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MA7P-HMO7-OBDU-K5KP-ZTEJ-F4VI-MAP7",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"Vb8cnHtbqcb_67XkyNuxObW-j0LrxnKjVqa2DAtOk
     r9YjCaI9BdhjaOjYPQctqdXFSQ5p9_LHGSA"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"7HgWOueHftKdmOtn3T0As9hw8_zAES5U82KJ5KEa
     PyV8y0bNKWADYbuklEHMcVht_9goAOMl_hE",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Inbound",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MBF6-A6BS-M3M3-BT6K-JS3R-UEUI-IRBT",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"wqSCFcY3p6-4jO32u3DWI-8YGLpoBj3nboEM_gm4v
     j_at2HY_aD4qCV1nkWRhVMrMD-WTox7G0sA"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"hSbexrjzeJzgJFVtOy4XOP2n84N4VLttgP6tbUDA
     NdUoULQ0W7QhRHEILN6iuuq5XuxQqL2LTB4",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},



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         {
           "Resource":"Outbound",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MAY4-ZV3E-CCLL-GJ54-2TJU-K323-BJAE",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"Yo4h5mJsW0pocasjvnd839ICa-dqJK0Q6mNRByzmH
     0Wrmff62DuPUgH5Si1mQzQ3eYDj21vACQ0A"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"iWQoqRUkCeN90KMHPpNMH17fOiOfXNbexlCz-Y9j
     KeRllsfoZ-QpOHbru8HM_si8Ma0_Zan0vTw",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Network",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MDMP-ZV3Q-TL33-JKBK-ONM5-CZOY-LPJD",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"7yrGvA-wVorqDfuS4KoxD4rosyCu1ae9qXLlhyS8s
     ubnwjM9xA_hvkwc7LQeaCOgD7SiV39Kj16A"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"EYOG1Vzx9yu_GJXj4b1g0M1VGM_OKS_NuHF18c-m
     IqHTpioTf2bOkesUJKpzqwMvciISqz4STzE",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Application",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MCYA-ZVF4-3QCB-MEQN-7K3L-L6MW-FPMV",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"IoJUXGyFCjQZP0ZoLF5oCiJeGA9UyZbATCi0FJxfm
     qdrkKWy138f8VZRKzBSefP3mgPcUARiXIOA"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"GR5BbtfJGwAtLsD_VWS9wofM6PadfcARfHI0TRGv
     aki2GwoKT6rwc3UnbWKYnXwdgakQcpnAphA",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Credential",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MD5W-K3CL-LJ5Q-YVXA-CMFG-5SPX-TUXV",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{



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                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"TdGC2V98FOC6E5WC0SJ0T8sTHvN8I4h0_AcJp1Qob
     Vo0ZiAKkkCE3zUsjVmR4dHwFTlARj6swnuA"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"eIhnA06b9mENMyqvUxznx61t4DiEXW1hL7yKOiDK
     b0tT7BQkZkDQ3p_Dwby_IErcKqExCQqS3pU",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Task",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MBI3-CXJZ-ZGOU-U72A-QL5W-ZHNF-RLG3",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"FSl9fvdqdhRYdzzSjSwBuuc51nyDGzXWHjWj28u_L
     r7Ppq3qpk7Tr447CwBwTQHdtTNkkrddqW2A"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"m4TFMtSo5LiaCLhMXQtTHuTksfocg29jDYT9umr9
     jiRMCJWGDfMz24sptRRY15E8BjLRYCOOw8w",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}},
         {
           "Resource":"Bookmark",
           "Key":{
             "Udf":"MDEC-T7A4-FMKQ-ARG4-A7XL-C5YG-6Z7P",
             "PublicParameters":{
               "PublicKeyECDH":{
                 "crv":"X448",
                 "Public":"ax1r7_wqg5r1ddHKMWCesT0NhjN5kn8lN0rI9_RTN
     CDhda76PxB5piX7Z3_mIoUp9kC8SmR-KCeA"}},
             "PrivateParameters":{
               "PrivateKeyECDH":{
                 "Private":"mPdKM_St3NhCqz4pvxOJ3suxYGP11yXpKc3ESn8z
     IPSko9hffME6LGaorxBZX78AC6imabN_ur4",
                 "crv":"X448"}}}}
         ]}}

   The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to
   export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device,
   neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from
   the administration device.









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   This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are
   used by the device when operating within the context of the account
   are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device
   manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key
   contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random
   and unguessable.

3.2.2.  Connection Assertion

   The administration device combines the public keys specified in the
   device profile with the public components of the keys specified in
   the activation record to calculate the public keys of the device
   operating in the context of the account.  These public keys are then
   used to create at a ConnectionDevice and a ConnectionService
   assertion signed by the account administration signature key.

   The ConnectionDevice assertion is used by the device to authenticate
   it to other devices connected to the account.  This connection
   assertion specifies the Encryption, Authentication, and Signature
   keys the device is to use in the context of the account and the list
   of roles that have been authorized for the device..






























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   {
     "ConnectionDevice":{
       "Roles":["message",
         "web"
         ],
       "Signature":{
         "Udf":"MA72-GAIH-AETH-DMWS-6WMP-TX4P-4DSR",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"JT9yarZYOkJlcW43IopCv6oS4Ode9JCgzOTys9xRvtDRE
     Ajywqk70JbSzBucJL9u3egYKCOdUo4A"}}},
       "Encryption":{
         "Udf":"MARU-OXNG-MA6F-7LZQ-R75I-2DSO-7RHN",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"sa2gDOJ6fqmAYsT2FM96o01XjIfMF_DsCzSrGAtQp0YA8
     gsF8_GGYTl3xr1wJcYXkdT0pdUkNEoA"}}},
       "ProfileUdf":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
       "Authentication":{
         "Udf":"MBGO-55A4-MBVM-L2G7-4T5B-NILX-AODX",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"UnCaMwkkjEbs7jHvvKvzlLYCdnOjIIRRSn_xEx-0_OEge
     LLH2bsK2PqYr7tIsjmJGi84ry7FDB-A"}}}}}

   The ConnectionService assertion is used to authenticate the device to
   the Mesh service.  In order to allow the assertion to fit in a single
   packet, it is important that this assertion be as small as possible.
   Only the Authentication key is specified.

   The corresponding ConnectionService assertion is:

   {
     "ConnectionService":{
       "ProfileUdf":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
       "Authentication":{
         "Udf":"MBGO-55A4-MBVM-L2G7-4T5B-NILX-AODX",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"UnCaMwkkjEbs7jHvvKvzlLYCdnOjIIRRSn_xEx-0_OEge
     LLH2bsK2PqYr7tIsjmJGi84ry7FDB-A"}}}}}






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   The ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an
   X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices
   connected to the same account without the need for interaction with
   the Mesh service.  Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account
   can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice
   recognition device connected to that account.

   While the ConnectionDeviceassertion MAY be used to mediate external
   interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides
   the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of
   the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on
   which occasions.  Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with
   the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate
   the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions.

   Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between
   devices connected to the same account.  All communication between
   Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service.  This enables
   abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and
   every inbound message.

3.3.  Service

   Mesh services are described by a ProfileService.  This specifies the
   encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact with
   the abstract service.

























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   {
     "ProfileService":{
       "ServiceAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MBC7-GBU6-CLL7-USJM-UCQ2-72R2-2H7O",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"TqIu0kEwjnjeXeZeID53a9893eRH-BRPc5iQ1_d-J_A_E
     zGclqGTlaHJSOyf1bfu0Q2VNkWtiwUA"}}},
       "ServiceEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MBIH-BWP2-Z43Z-NIR6-SWLY-WIMD-S7AK",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"2eapnJ1gDZN4bHJGoHYLciCcLCMmnTZtaDF-e26BxJwE_
     0vO5PAWCkc5xZeGcGr3ITpdzrWhAFiA"}}},
       "ServiceSignature":{
         "Udf":"MAYH-WLYU-U6TX-S64V-E5WS-5LLO-C4ZW",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"H_yTB3rN_OP86NjklUOHr_WP1vgXQHoWXnOXRsQkv9kgc
     XrMD3FEBJAhxS4bFrQJl7p-GTVe20YA"}}},
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MD3E-FN6W-3G45-YQ43-QXYR-CU4X-RKG5",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"X-VsXh60gID4HH8Jh-H4Y1sgrCIyYSO3rbErd7be7MV0E
     6xG7XxsSeO4OCFQIBszhUaO41KX2AMA"}}}}}

   Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they
   cannot interact directly.  A device connected to an account can only
   interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to
   provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the
   service.  Such a device is called a Mesh Host.

   Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device
   connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by
   whatever other management protocols prove convenient.  The only part
   of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected
   to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the
   ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use
   in interactions with that specific host.







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   {
     "ConnectionService":{
       "ProfileUdf":"MB7I-UXTA-P3GC-ARHP-QZFB-5254-LESZ",
       "Subject":"MBCS-LJG2-NL6V-RZQB-HRVJ-JFII-C5VI",
       "Authority":"MD3E-FN6W-3G45-YQ43-QXYR-CU4X-RKG5",
       "Authentication":{
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"8HS0cmDkhaPVc-ZCUg91bc6CzPkN5hU7884DodLYakJSu
     JBE1Zc1movkB7hc4WRQMI794NAPdzoA"}}}}}

   Mesh Services MAY make use of the profile and activation mechanism
   used to connect devices to accounts to manage the connection of hosts
   to services.  But this is optional.  It is never necessary for a
   device to publish a ProfileHost assertion.

4.  Catalogs

   Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh
   Service Account.  The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in
   any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are
   used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages.

   Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form:

   <prefix>_<name>

   Where <prefix> is the IANA assigned service name.  The assigned
   service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm.  Thus, all catalogs
   specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence
   mmm_.

   The following catalogs are currently specified within the
   Mathematical Mesh.

   Access: mmm_Access  Describes access control policy for performing
      operations on the account.  The Access catalog is the only Mesh
      catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under
      normal circumstances.

   Application: mmm_Application  Describes configuration information for
      applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and
      SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself.

   Bookmark: mmm_Bookmark  Describes Web bookmarks and other citations
      allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the
      profile.



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   Contact: mmm_Contact  Describes logical and physical contact
      information for people and organizations.

   Credential: mmm_Credential  Describes credentials used to access
      network resources.

   Device: mmm_Device  Describes the set of devices connected to the
      account and the permissions assigned to them

   Network: mmm_Network  Describes network settings such as WiFi access
      points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.

   Member: mmm_Member  Describes the set of members connected to a group
      account.

   Publication: mmm_Publication  Describes data published under the
      account context.  The data MAY be stored in the publication
      catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server).

   Task: mmm_CatalogTask  Describes tasks assigned to the user including
      calendar entries and to do lists.

   The Access, and Publication catalogs are used by the service in
   certain Mesh Service Protocol interactions.  The Device and Member
   catalogs are used to track the connection of devices to a user
   account and members to a group for administrative purposes.  These
   interactions are further described below.

   In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a
   superset of the capabilities of an existing application.  For
   example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions
   of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function
   of the traditional 'to do list' application.  Combining these
   functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the
   passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical
   presence, etc.

   In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a
   superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy
   formats and (where available) recent extensions.  Where a catalog
   entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the
   original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate
   interoperability.








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4.1.  Access

   The access catalog mmm_Access contains a list of access control
   entries providing authorization to devices authenticated by a
   particular credential.  The access catalog provides information that
   is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf of the user.  It
   is therefore necessary for the service to be able to decrypt entries
   in the catalog.

   The entries in the catalog have type CatalogedAccess and specify a
   capability.  The following capabilities are defined:

   NullCapability  A capability granting no access rights.  May be used
      to establish a positive statement denying all access.

   AccessCapability  Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
      means to request privileged account operations.  For example,
      requesting the status of an account catalog.  Also used to
      provision devices with a copy of their CatalogedDevice entry
      encrypted under a key held by the device.

   CryptographicCapability  Specifies a private key encrypted under the
      encryption key of the service and criteria specifying the parties
      authorized to request use of the key.

   PublicationCapability  Authorizes a device authenticated by specified
      means to obtain a data item.

   The Access catalog plays a central role in all operations performed
   by the service on behalf of the user.

   Every access capability is gated by a specified set of authentication
   criteria.  The following authentication criteria are currently
   defined:

   Profile Authentication Key  The account profile authentication key
      authorizes any account action without the need for an access
      catalog entry.  This capability is normally only used during
      account binding.  Administration devices SHOULD NOT have access to
      the account profile authentication key after binding is completed.

   Device Authentication Key  The service will only perform the
      operation if the device making the request presents the specified
      authentication key.

      This form of authentication is necessary to restrict access to
      account operations so that only connected devices can interact
      with stores, etc.



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   Account Profile Identifier  The service will only perform the
      operation if the device making the request presents an
      authentication key that is credentialed by a connection assertion
      to the specified account profile.

      This form of authentication is necessary to perform administration
      operations on a group account since it is the account rather than
      the device that is authorized to perform the operation.

   Proof of Knowledge  The service will only perform the operation if
      proof of knowledge of the identified shared secret is provided.

      This form of authentication criteria is used to allow device
      connection and contact exchange by means of static (i.e. printed)
      QR codes.

   Future: Currently, the set of authentication criteria is limited to
   direct grants of a single capability to a single specified device or
   account.  This approach may prove to be unnecessarily verbose
   requiring the same information to be repeated multiple times.

4.1.1.  Access Capability

   The access capability permits a specified service operation on the
   account.  Optionally, an access capability MAY specify a Data entry
   encrypted to a key held by the device.

   The access capability specifies the set of rights granted to the
   requester and optionally specifies an EnvelopedCatalogedDevice entry
   containing the CatalogedDevice entry for the device encrypted under
   the base encryption key or account encryption key of the device.

   The CatalogedDeviceDigest value serves as a tag for the cached data.

4.1.1.1.  Operation Rights

   The reference code does not currently implement operation rights
   beyond denying all operations to devices that do not have an access
   capability entry.

   Expansion of the rights handling is planned to permit granular
   expression of access rights.

   mmm_o_UnbindAccount  UnbindAccount

   mmm_o_Connect  Connect

   mmm_o_Complete  Complete



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   mmm_o_Status  Status (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)

   mmm_o_Download  Download (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)

   mmm_o_Transact  Transact (of specified catalogs or all catalogs)

   mmm_o_Post  Post outbound message

4.1.1.2.  Messaging

   The reference code has limited messaging capabilities at present and
   messaging rights are not specified.  The following is a list of
   possible rights:

   mmm_m_Contact  Contact messages from the specified subject.

   mmm_m_Confirmation  Confirmation messages from the specified subject.

   mmm_m_Async  Asynchronous delivery messages (e.g. mail)

   mmm_m_Sync  Synchronous delivery messages (e.g. chat)

   mmm_m_Presence  Forward presence request.

   The following media are defined

   mmm_c_Text  Text that MUST NOT contain links or external references

   mmm_c_Linked  Text that MAY contain links or external reference

   mmm_c_Audio  Audio data (e.g.  VOIP, voicemail)

   mmm_c_Video  Video data

   mmm_c_Code  Content containing active code including macros, scripts
      and executables.

4.1.2.  Null Capability

   The null capability is used to affirmatively deny access to a
   function.  This allows access requests from previously authorized
   devices whose credentials have been revoked to be handled separately
   from requests from devices that were never authorized.








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4.1.3.  Cryptographic Capabilities

   A Mesh Service can perform cryptographic operations on a private key
   according to access criteria specified by the user.  This capability
   is used to support use of threshold cryptography to mitigate
   compromise of a particular device or individual.  The splitting of a
   cryptographic key into two or more parts allows the use of that key
   to be split into two or more roles.

   Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the
   service.  As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a
   Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of
   breaches in other parts of the system have occurred.  And the user
   trusts the service to provide availability of the service.

   A Mesh Service MAY also offer to perform private key operations for
   other purposes.  An embargo agent might offer to decrypt data under a
   private key but only after a specified date and time.  An expiry
   agent might offer to decrypt data but only before a specified date
   and time.  Such services MAY be reserved to the customers of a
   specified service or provided to the general public.  Users of such
   services MAY combine key services provided by multiple service
   providers using threshold techniques to achieve separation of roles.

   Since a service might not willingly co-operate with an account
   transfer request, extension of the Mesh service protocol will be
   required to enable threshold sharing of the keys required to effect
   account transfer.  This would require one administration device to
   act as a proxy for threshold signature etc. operations being
   requested by another administration device.  While implementation of
   such a scheme to support this limited function could be achieved with
   little difficulty, such a scheme might not support the wider range of
   peer-to-peer threshold capabilities that might be useful.  For
   example, the confirmation protocol might be modified so that instead
   of merely providing non-repudiable evidence of the user's response to
   a request, the confirmation device served as a policy enforcement
   point through control of a necessary threshold share.

   The following service cryptographic operations are specified:

4.1.3.1.  Threshold Key Share

   A private key share s, held by the service is split into key shares
   x, y such that a = x + y.  One key share is encrypted under a
   decryption key held by the service.  The other is encrypted under a
   public key specified by the party making the request.





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   This operation is not currently implemented in the Reference code.
   When implemented, it will allow the functions of the administration
   device to be threshold shared between the device and the service,
   thus allowing the administration capability to be revoked if the
   device is lost, stolen or otherwise compromised.

   Implementation of this capability is expected to be based on the
   scheme described in . [draft-komlo-frost]

4.1.3.2.  Key Agreement

   A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate the
   value (sl + c).P where l, c are integers specified by the requestor
   and P is a point on the curve.

   This operation is used

4.1.3.3.  Threshold Signature

   A private key share s, held by the service is used to calculate a
   contribution to a threshold signature scheme.

   The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is
   described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold].

   Implementation of signatures is not currently covered pending
   completion of [draft-irtf-cfrg-frost].

4.1.3.4.  Fair Exchange

   Perform a Micali Fair Exchange trusted intermediary operation.

   On receipt of a signature SIG_B(Z), where Z=E_k(A, B, M), the service
   decrypts Z and returns the result to B.

4.1.4.  Publication Capability

   The publication capability is not currently implemented.
   Implementation would allow the Claim/PollClaim mechanism to be
   eliminated in favor of a mechanism capable of re-use for other
   purposes.










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4.2.  Application

   The application catalog mmm_Application contains
   CatalogEntryApplication entries which describe the use of specific
   applications under the Mesh Service Account.  Multiple application
   accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh
   Service Account.  Each account being specified in a separate entry.

   The CatalogEntryApplication entries only contain configuration
   information for the application as it applies to the account as a
   whole.  If the application requires separate configuration for
   individual devices, this is specified in the device activation
   record.

   Two applications are currently defined:

   Mail  An SMTP email account and associated encryption and signature
      keys for S/MIME and OpenPGP.

   SSH  Secure Shell Client.

   Accounts MAY specify multiple instances of each but each application
   instance is considered as describing a single application account.
   Thus, if Alice has email accounts alice@example.com and
   alice@example.net, she will have application entries for each.
   Accounts connected to Alice's Mesh account may be authorized to use
   either, both or none of the email accounts.

   *Note*: The implementation of these features in the current
   specification is considered to be a 'proof of concept' rather than a
   proposed final form.  There are many issues that need to be
   considered when integrating a legacy protocol with extensive
   deployment into a new platform.

4.2.1.  Mail

   Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more
   CatalogEntryApplicationMail entries, one for each email account
   connected to the Mesh profile.  The corresponding activation records
   for the connected devices contain information used to provide the
   device with the necessary decryption information.

   Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and
   outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used
   for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption.






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   {
     "CatalogedApplicationMail":{
       "AccountAddress":"alice@example.net",
       "InboundConnect":"imap://alice@imap.example.net",
       "OutboundConnect":"submit://alice@submit.example.net",
       "SmimeSign":{
         "Udf":"MAE2-33FZ-R2AP-BN5O-YAO4-VGQD-YTIZ",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyRSA":{
             "n":"0iK8bfwAC98EJt6mcDSNxBk7ybZFsHAvJJRBWWymr9fz95u9yr
     qp1HBNrH1j1z4eCff1lzHiLFVK_QjPbf1liy1aq1sFcrZw8ZppkcXmaUVwk0uDsm6
     vEbHLdPn3f4W1TkGYhfC0TfaXu_XOJJQmg3RwWmqBaWz5BZK9zUq_KzoHf5WUfUHq
     giY_ix9Kd6XGpb46O1aCgQl1FGHt039QtnoNeg5mHn4egI7AX042xPwGvyvIWvstj
     eM5TX77Iow56l4-8MJlu5B2KuwdmxaFJetss7paAf0o3GsZpq9pKQ5b5sAvdl3PVg
     wFFZDi6lLXG3AnmFan1V0pS2jyLtEnhQ",
             "e":"AQAB",
             "kid":"MAE2-33FZ-R2AP-BN5O-YAO4-VGQD-YTIZ"}}},
       "SmimeEncrypt":{
         "Udf":"MANV-7HIN-RGQG-VOJF-IYQI-ORA4-ZDVA",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyRSA":{
             "n":"qxhcmT2vmt9aXflFd1LCYWBwAN4Y23S_FDneSi4JIrQNer5ztl
     Ctuc4AtJdoLMuMyfBFhbH6NW_5QzbuPgnK13uxeQDai5Olbrg1izblPnJFTM6ZYb1
     xNX9hoMaveARs_A7EK6k0ij6BWz6aRhEUNB9R5h9O06beKoOliBS4aTmtym586EL_
     MOk9guFf1vCAu0XCfRy6lyNYZQRIx11DTLFAszYMbDEjGeQbkcXRujWZcQgthiF0r
     77KhEdnfcDh9f8Co2DqD5pa6vzHmiYcsJl-By-TsMb7l4gP7DvRTE8iyUx2dYd-Gs
     HFfUzA8jjKLLtYhMrKWoooyOVX4RtvgQ",
             "e":"AQAB",
             "kid":"MANV-7HIN-RGQG-VOJF-IYQI-ORA4-ZDVA"}}},
       "OpenpgpSign":{
         "Udf":"MDGI-YJTT-N3G5-VQRV-V6HH-XNKA-5DG4",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyRSA":{
             "n":"3_XUiJgDWbZn-hlNZDO7t805kp5K1hQv_MbrT1fTlLbRW1gxj7
     xflcduhzBafh_Do7NWDtps21U53ZauC9dws4JHa7WkTRVfVAPleoj5EHux3xJQfPS
     C_0WU88c7ff0xetJEfIbTpDB7Hr7S6CsFpAGEk-7sIYK6_U8jUG_R3WD4z-GNgqhb
     qxjj9_v37lDzIFdwFl7srxjStdVnkGsytuVvsgyfJmzeXP9uKamxj5yWBYbrRKMq0
     rnKGN57HNHT7x55DoxH7_5Kw5Hq9J0XPD0mBrgGOVvuI5kESkLCtJAMp4hpoAsPdQ
     582XlxUJ0euS3h6KEwaDWSIKfoibJ5VQ",
             "e":"AQAB",
             "kid":"MDGI-YJTT-N3G5-VQRV-V6HH-XNKA-5DG4"}}},
       "OpenpgpEncrypt":{
         "Udf":"MC2E-4BAB-AVZC-B6QY-UJZR-P73B-V26M",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyRSA":{
             "n":"oFFbPPtTlpbNHOe2b1WGaeQCT-l8AWUzkeOfLOvVxZDjVzmQW2
     IAnezIiH_xnh-RAR8i63skPV9pMGLaQBJw2Ld9ozjPilPIAq1gHWA_qsece0lfHmU
     dGlHNc_gmkjD3t7IIm2Dn17G9hgTRTdLb2Ktp3KdCJhSLBwHgcR3FGgqLRqV3ueZS



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     fBLW6ZVCOQiN_aIH8yuvF2KwE9bRfEYul85k_L91onplWW7o9R4DbbSf53GvO0yol
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     37syrqqa-KZzXmb8XkdssYBFfWGhXvIQ",
             "e":"AQAB",
             "kid":"MC2E-4BAB-AVZC-B6QY-UJZR-P73B-V26M"}}},
       "Key":"mailto:alice@example.net",
       "Grant":["web"
         ],
       "EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
             "enc":"A256CBC",
             "kid":"EBQC-5T3E-MZPA-A5HZ-AJNY-GJIM-ID5L",
             "Salt":"6sHLmXq_WNMYj_UUBJWkOg",
             "recipients":[{
                 "kid":"MBSK-2Y6G-DK6P-T6TU-OSLD-GCFW-MPHG",
                 "epk":{
                   "PublicKeyECDH":{
                     "crv":"X448",
                     "Public":"HKVJsj9T6h000KweUdJhBJtF2sdF9752AHW2K
     Lvyx-RbCV6yApzCSBDIfUgJ3rpbVB7pLEi-sb6A"}},
                 "wmk":"QsJDbr0Nhq8EvpVMO5k1aakXjeCwIjU2nemfiFUVYgiA
     jfGFSFak8w"}
               ]},
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           ],
         [{
             "enc":"A256CBC",
             "kid":"EBQG-6MHH-4MKO-A3BW-4QAT-5G4V-KGPN",
             "Salt":"4rEUyqJfh9JNQxTMWQn_kw",
             "recipients":[{
                 "kid":"MBSK-2Y6G-DK6P-T6TU-OSLD-GCFW-MPHG",
                 "epk":{
                   "PublicKeyECDH":{
                     "crv":"X448",
                     "Public":"RMvPIefL9-VCMhjeqEDHtoypp8zhJEeaJFA7y
     _2NS6X0WiDrDK_zy2Qzq3G14wSoqfB7vk3OvteA"}},
                 "wmk":"2QrhwRJV3-vzfCX72DIp5t5d-i03JVpncvJlar6hJ1DD
     Sk7HPsMCvA"}
               ]},
           "g0rrPHxEvZNl0mNnuVb_7QcRweV96um9vKhQBEU-ykzzey_wD5klgY_G
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Hallam-Baker            Expires 30 December 2023               [Page 30]

Internet-Draft            Mesh Schema Reference                June 2023


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         [{
             "enc":"A256CBC",
             "kid":"EBQK-73NN-Y6SF-V7O5-RFW6-LT46-ILTA",
             "Salt":"dBmXzbaps7tStwW6lyYKNA",
             "recipients":[{
                 "kid":"MBSK-2Y6G-DK6P-T6TU-OSLD-GCFW-MPHG",



Hallam-Baker            Expires 30 December 2023               [Page 31]

Internet-Draft            Mesh Schema Reference                June 2023


                 "epk":{
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         [{
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             "recipients":[{
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Hallam-Baker            Expires 30 December 2023               [Page 33]

Internet-Draft            Mesh Schema Reference                June 2023


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           ]
         ]}}

   Note that the inbound and outbound server configuration does not
   specify the access credentials to be used to access the service.
   These are specified in the Credential catalog.

   Future: The mail application should support automated means of
   credentialling the public key including obtaining an X.509v3
   certificate or uploading the key to a key service.

4.2.2.  SSH

   SSH configuration profiles are described by entries in multiple
   catalogs

   CatalogedApplicationSsh entries in the Applications catalog.  Specify
      an SSH client credential or certificate signing credential

   CatalogedCredential entries in the Credential catalog.  Specify SSH
      host keys (i.e. contents of the known hosts file)



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   CatalogedContact entries in the Contacts catalog.  Specify SSH client
      keys (i.e. material from which an authorized_key file entry might
      be constructed).

   Future: Client and Host certificates are not currently supported.
   This is clearly desirable but requires additional implementation
   considerations.

   Future: Provisioning of SSH host private keys is currently out of
   scope.  This is best considered as part of the device provisioning
   and authorization flow and will lead to entries being created/updated
   in the device catalog.

   A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes
   within a single Mesh Account.  This allows a system administrator
   servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each
   of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably)
   revoked at contract termination.

   {
     "CatalogedApplicationSsh":{
       "ClientKey":{
         "Udf":"MAOY-3KTL-BIW6-BS7V-EANA-AZTL-5Q2Y",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyRSA":{
             "n":"wKWnEU6lrWi0oY05uOlefb0Lf1d0wBgBAJcoTKmabaZuIdv8G-
     495OJ-QyzRI8yRdqPMWFhUidHMpN9h_8D5mXXzFee34iULjfdWdteEM8M2XKGcKa2
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     suGaqPFpXw-4QDSJtC2QqnW6wt7ovcaQ",
             "e":"AQAB",
             "kid":"MAOY-3KTL-BIW6-BS7V-EANA-AZTL-5Q2Y"}}},
       "Key":"MAOY-3KTL-BIW6-BS7V-EANA-AZTL-5Q2Y",
       "Grant":["web",
         "threshold"
         ],
       "EnvelopedEscrow":[[{
             "enc":"A256CBC",
             "kid":"EBQM-5LE4-Z26W-WCG6-OSZ3-CLO2-7DDM",
             "Salt":"v0Le6nYg2hisQRiYi-lRdQ",
             "recipients":[{
                 "kid":"MBSK-2Y6G-DK6P-T6TU-OSLD-GCFW-MPHG",
                 "epk":{
                   "PublicKeyECDH":{
                     "crv":"X448",
                     "Public":"Xmlb80F5xDeLqrzGB1tAvvoV2AqUOFNImeVGW
     sdcUmht9zO1XOoTd5EZodFnr5N0RNaafrhOEsyA"}},



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                 "wmk":"wqcv5AGkFpMePLRoszuEG6uZ8lj--UOyF-uC-8c21MSN
     vrcvlksccQ"}
               ]},
           "kEXzFK9QHjuDjo0dxsG3xhpULXCder_shCN5rWeymF805vj748CXhkLb
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     f3MR_uRBiy7wn7CMs4q6_vzxbjSEUndFwfSJZRo6yuMYiQb69ijMoMMv8U2pzBS7q
     Bu-5hvcKfaiZqTYgmjCwDFe8w1jpwuZ76Vw8j1XxbWpfs8NCTMDxu6WCA0Mk7itZJ
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           ]
         ],
       "LocalName":"ssh"}}

4.3.  Bookmark

   The bookmark catalog mmm_bookmark contains CatalogEntryBookmark
   entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing
   them to be shared between devices connected to the profile.

   The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently
   limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks.
   Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations
   is a work in progress.

   {
     "CatalogedBookmark":{
       "Uri":"http://www.example.com",
       "Title":"site1",
       "LocalName":"Sites-1",
       "Uid":"ND3H-L37J-BWNZ-NERL-XWFR-ZC46-CW53"}}

4.4.  Contact

   The contact catalog mmm_contact contains CatalogEntryContact entries
   which describe the person, organization or location described.

   The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the
   capabilities of vCard [RFC2426].

   {
     "CatalogedContact":{
       "Key":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
       "Self":true,
       "Contact":{
         "ContactPerson":{
           "Id":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
           "Anchors":[{
               "Udf":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
               "Validation":"Self"}
             ],
           "NetworkAddresses":[{
               "Address":"alice@example.com",



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               "EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{
                   "EnvelopeId":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
                   "dig":"S512",
                   "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQjNULV
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                 {
                   "signatures":[{
                       "alg":"S512",
                       "kid":"MB3T-WIPZ-JRCW-QZFM-SCQL-OVVO-AHO2",
                       "signature":"lhicUvvDwdI2cJGDmMDmEYhZIDOp0be5



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                     ],
                   "PayloadDigest":"hg5Z9SBDuRlEje8R3-0KZFBNHW738w1k
     0ZvF-nNJKZ4acEZKjmAwOzx3cbf6HXJoWy3eLs4BqYdhXQWkftir1g"}
                 ],
               "Protocols":[{
                   "Protocol":"mmm"}
                 ]}
             ],
           "Sources":[{
               "Validation":"Self",
               "EnvelopedSource":[{
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                   "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb2
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     ICAgICAgICAgICJraWQiOiAiTUIzVC1XSVBaLUpSQ1ctUVpGTS1TQ1FMLU9WVk8tQ
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                 {
                   "signatures":[{
                       "alg":"S512",
                       "kid":"MDE2-MKMI-773P-GJ3F-YYAI-UVCK-OMKS",
                       "signature":"rX3vdDg4XWLs91hy8okzai4Rw6nwBSGR
     YxxgrCIM4lJmKRGM8MvFLm7x17qsZE-rI0pDuoyXu1AAiVcUtUpqYHFDHb7Rg7ApT
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                     ],
                   "PayloadDigest":"PJFh1hJR7p0Wt1dJFU1mOca6ZO51jMlz
     abR5BiHDHvpLZpUWvqApCOr6U9A-qFO8qyiLPru6YRWgaKjEgyA3Jg"}
                 ]}
             ]}}}}

   The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source
   of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and
   outbound message requests.  For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be
   granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption
   entry for the service.

4.5.  Credential

   The credential catalog mmm_credential contains CatalogEntryCredential
   entries which describe credentials used to access network resources.

   {
     "CatalogedCredential":{
       "Service":"ftp.example.com",
       "Username":"alice1",
       "Password":"password"}}

   Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential
   catalog.  If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be
   managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be
   created for each device.

4.6.  Device

   The device catalog mmm_Device contains CatalogEntryDevice entries
   which describe the devices connected to the account and the
   permissions assigned to them.

   Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated
   CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection
   records for the account.  These records are described in further
   detail in section ???.

4.7.  Network

   The network catalog contains CatalogEntryNetwork entries which
   describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.

   {
     "CatalogedNetwork":{
       "Service":"myWiFi",
       "Password":"securePassword"}}



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4.8.  Publication

   [Note, this catalog is obsolete, the functions provided by this
   catalog are being merged with the Access catalog]

   The publication catalog mmm_Publication contains
   CatalogEntryPublication entries which describe content published
   through the account.

   If the data being published is small, it MAY be specified in the
   CatalogEntryPublication entry itself as enveloped data.  Otherwise a
   link to the external content is required.

   The Publication catalog is currently used to publish two types of
   data:

   Contact  Used in the Static QR Code Contact Exchange interaction.

   Profile Device  Used in the Preconfigured Device Connection
      interaction.

   The interactions using this published data are described in
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

   >>>> Unfinished SchemaEntryPublication

   Missing example 13

4.9.  Task

   The Task catalog mmm_Task contains CatalogEntryTask entries which
   describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to
   do lists.

   The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the
   iCalendar specification [RFC5545].  Specification of additional
   fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or
   completion of other tasks is a work in progress.

   {
     "CatalogedTask":{
       "Title":"SomeItem",
       "Key":"NB57-PDLZ-LSIV-DJVF-OQGD-APGT-OZMO"}}

5.  Spools

   Spools are DARE Sequences containing an append only list of messages
   sent or received by an account.  Three spools are currently defined:



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   Inbound  Messages sent to the account.  These are encrypted under the
      account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
      current at the time the message was sent.

   Outbound  Messages sent from the account.  These are encrypted under
      the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
      current at the time the message was sent.

   Local  Messages sent from the account for internal use.  These are
      encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient
      alone.  This is either the account administration encryption key
      or a device encryption key.

   Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier.  Messages created
   at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned
   a random message identifier.  Responses to previous messages are
   assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to
   which they respond by means of a message digest function.

   Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope
   which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message
   digest function to the message identifier.  Each stored message has
   an associated state which is initially set to the state Initial and
   MAY be subsequently altered by one or more MessageComplete messages
   subsequently appended to the spool.  The allowable message states
   depending upon the spool in question.

5.1.  Outbound

   The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent
   and MessageComplete messages reporting changes to the status of the
   messages stored on the spool.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent,
   Received or Refused:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Sent  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the
      Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it.

   Received  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
      the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has
      acknowledged receipt.

   Refused  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
      the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it.




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   MessageComplete messages are only valid when posted to the spool by
   the service.

5.2.  Inbound

   The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh
   service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting
   changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Read  The message has been read.

   A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread
   state by marking it as being in the Initial state.

5.3.  Local

   The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative
   functions.  In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and
   the Mesh Service require access to the local spool.

   The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify
   administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some
   purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the
   result of a connection request.

   The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a
   device with the activation and connection records required to access
   the service as an authorized client.  Servicing these requests
   requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the
   spool by envelope id.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial,
   Closed:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Closed  The action associated with the message has been completed.

   Future: Redefining the role of the Local spool would allow the Claim/
   PollClaim operations used in device connection to be eliminated and
   greater consistency achieved between the device connection
   interactions.





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5.4.  Log

   The log spo

6.  Logs

   The logging functions are not currently implemented.

   Logs are records of events.  Mesh logs SHOULD be encrypted and
   notarized.

   The following logs are specified:

   Service  A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
      actions performed on the account

   Exception  A log written by the Mesh Service containing a list of all
      exception events such as requests for access that were refused.

   Notary  A log written by administration devices connected to the
      account containing a sequence of status entries and cross
      notarization receipts.

   The notary log will perform a particularly important role in future
   Mesh versions as it provides the ultimate root of trust for the
   account itself through cross notarization with the account holder's
   MSP which in turn achieves mutual cross notarization with every other
   MSP by cross notarizing with the Callsign registry.  Thus every Mesh
   user is cross notarized with every other Mesh user making use of the
   Callsign registry through a graph with a diameter of 4.

7.  Cryptographic Operations

   The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including
   threshold operations.  For convenience, these are gathered here and
   specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the
   specification.

7.1.  Key Derivation from Seed

   Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described
   in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].  Use of the keyname parameter allows
   multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single key.
   Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the
   private keys associated with the profile.






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   The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers
   specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key
   operation:

7.2.  Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.

   Every Mesh message has a unique Message Identifier MessageId.  The
   MakeID() function is used to calculate the value of Envelope
   Identifier and Response identifier from the message identifier as
   follows:

   static string MakeID(string udf, string content) {
       var (code, bds) = Udf.Parse(udf);
       return code switch
           {
               UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 =>
                   Udf.ContentDigestOfDataString(
                   bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
                       CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512),
               _ => Udf.ContentDigestOfDataString(
               bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
                       CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512),
               };

   Where the values of content are given as follows:

   application/mmm/envelopeid  The proposed IANA content identifier for
      the Mesh message type.

   application/mmm/responseid  The proposed IANA content identifier for
      the Mesh message type.

   For example:

   MessageID
       = NCO5-AV7A-DZYY-A5JD-GGWI-KH3Y-OJND

   EnvelopeID
       = MBDW-KFHR-OR66-U6CR-CCEV-N4DD-MXXQ

   ResponseID
       = MACQ-IGXA-ZT5G-4GCI-CR4X-R5CS-Y4TY









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7.3.  Proof of Knowledge of PIN

   Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of MessagePinValidated MAY
   be authenticated by means of a PIN.  Currently two such messages are
   defined: MessageContact used in contact exchange and
   RequestConnection message used in device connection.

   The PIN codes used to authenticate MessagePinValidated messages are
   UDF Authenticator strings.  The type code of the identifier specifies
   the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary
   Data Sequence value specifies the key.

   The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are:

   PIN: string  A UDF Authenticator.  The type code of the identifier
      specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code
      and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key.

   Action: string  A code determining the specific action that the PIN
      code MAY be used to authenticate.  By convention this is the name
      of the Mesh message type used to perform the action.

   Account: string  The account for which the PIN code is issued.

   ClientNonce: binary  Nonce value generated by the client using the
      PIN code to authenticate its message.

   PayloadDigest: binary  The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that
      contains the message to be authenticated.  Note that if the
      envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the
      ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the
      plaintext.

   The following values of Action are currently defined:

   Device  Action info for device PIN

   Contact  Action info for contact PIN

   These inputs are used to derive values as follows:

   alg =           UdfAlg (PIN)
   pinData =       UdfBDS (PIN)
   saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData)
   saltedPIN =     UDFPresent (HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData)
   PinId =         UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))





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   The issuer of the PIN code stores the value saltedPIN for retrieval
   using the key PinId.

   The witness value for a Dare Envelope with payload digest
   PayloadDigest authenticated by a PIN code whose salted value is
   saltedPINData, issued by account Account is given by PinWitness() as
   follows:

   witnessData =   Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest
   witnessValue =  MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData)

   For example, to generate saltedPIN for the pin AAKI-IIAD-GQ3H-JUY3-
   SXZN-PENW-PQ used to authenticate a an action of type Device:

   pin = AAKI-IIAD-GQ3H-JUY3-SXZN-PENW-PQ
   action = message.

   alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
       = Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512

   hashalg = default (alg, HMAC_SHA_2_512)

   pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
       = System.Byte[]

   saltedPINData
       = hashalg(pinData, hashalg);
       = System.Byte[]

   saltedPIN = UDFPresent (hashalg + saltedPINData)
       = AA6H-GDQF-3QDF-B7MB-GBAO-RJ4O-ZTPI

   The PinId binding the pin to the account alice@example.com is

   Account =  alice@example.com

   PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
       = ACVB-JSGA-EUN7-QIGS-XYWQ-G3OU-77IZ

   Where MAC(data, key) is the message authentication code algorithm
   specified by the value of alg.

   When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is
   appended to the local spool.  This has the MessageId PinId and
   specifies the value saltedPIN in the field of that name.






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   When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type
   MessagePinValidated specifies the values ClientNonce, PinWitness and
   PinId in the fields of those names.  These values are used to
   authenticate the inner message data specified by the
   AuthenticatedData field.

7.4.  EARL

   The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to
   publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a
   static identifier such as a QR code.

   This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR
   code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account
   using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR
   code.

   In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format
   described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].

8.  Mesh Assertions

   Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more
   claims.  Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the
   Mathematical Mesh.

   Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes.  Mesh Profiles are
   self-signed assertions.  Assertions that are not self-signed are
   called declarations.  The only type of declaration currently defined
   is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to
   an account.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

                     Figure 1: Profiles And Connections

8.1.  Encoding

   The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a
   subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields:

   Identifier  An identifier for the assertion.

   Updated  The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last
      updated

   NotaryToken  An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary



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      tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service.  These establish a proof
      that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was
      created.

   Conditions  A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the
      status of the assertion if the relying party requires.

   The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to
   be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign] at a future date.

   Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from
   that of SAML.  Relying parties are required to process condition
   clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity.  Mesh Relying
   parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the
   trustworthiness of the provider.

   The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the
   Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause
   of any type relative to a ground truth.  In SAML applications, the
   relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source
   of ground truth.  A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not.
   Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are
   limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous
   statements from the Mesh Service.

8.2.  Mesh Profiles

   Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with
   important differences:

   *  Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity
      statements

   *  Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support
      renewal processing.

   *  Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of
      a profile being recorded in an append only log.

   Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI.  Unlike in the
   PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a
   small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh
   contributes their own axiom of trust.








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   It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities
   is redefined rather than eliminated.  Rather than making assertions
   whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently
   mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make
   assertions about immutable cryptographic keys.

   Every Profile MUST contain a SignatureKey field and MUST be signed by
   the key specified in that field.

   A Profile is valid if and only if:

   *  There is a SignatureKey field.

   *  The profile is signed under the key specified in the SignatureKey
      field.

   A profile has the status current if and only if:

   *  The Profile is valid

   *  Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the
      relying party and evaluates to true.

8.3.  Mesh Connections

   A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a
   device or a member to an account.

   Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity'
   certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are
   only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account
   and the service to which that account is bound and between the
   devices connected to an account.

   A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if
   and only if:

   *  The profile _P_ is valid

   *  The AuthorityUdf field of the connection is consistent with the
      UDF of _P_

   *  The profile is signed under the key specified in the
      AdministrationKey field of _P_.

   *  Any conditions specified in the profile are met





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   A connection has the status current with respect to an account with
   profile if and only if:

   *  The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
      _P_.

   *  The profile P is current.

   A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P
   if and only if:

   *  The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
      _P_.

   *  The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the
      DeviceAuthentication key specified in the connection.

8.4.  Device Pre-configuration

   The DevicePreconfiguration record provides a means of bundling all
   the information used to preconfigure a device for use in the Mesh.
   This comprises:

   *  The Enveloped ProfileDevice.

   *  A ConnectionDevice assertion credentialing the device to the
      configuration provider Mesh Service.

   *  A ConnectionService assertion credentialing the device to the
      configuration provider Mesh Service.

   *  The secret seed used to create the ProfileDevice data.

   The DevicePreconfiguration record MAY be used as the means of
   preconfiguring devices to allow connection to a user's account
   profile using the Preconfigured/Static QR Code device connection
   interaction.

   For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a
   Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration
   record created:

   {
     "DevicePreconfigurationPrivate":{
       "EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{
           "dig":"S512",
           "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
     9uRGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJ



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     DcmVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjMtMDYtMjhUMTc6MDA6NTBaIn0"},
         "ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlNpZ25hdHVyZSI6IH
     sKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNQ1JQLTdPUVAtTFpFRy1LREhULVdUTlEtSlM0QS1QR0Z
     SIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tl
     eUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIkVkNDQ4IiwKICAgICAgICAgICJQd
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     iRW5jcnlwdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNREY0LUNNQ1EtQktRWC0yUDZQ
     LVAySzItMjdVRC03QUdSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgI
     CAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLA
     ogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJGOEI0ZW9YSXZ6X0txSGplckZybkRqbkdjR3J
     jVDlYOTM0MnQ2WEpNeS1VY1FXRUt6clVNCiAgRGE5STFTUUljV0xESGIyQUJtTUZK
     ZmFBIn19fSwKICAgICJBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNR
     EY0LUNNQ1EtQktRWC0yUDZQLVAySzItMjdVRC03QUdSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1
     BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICA
     gICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJGOEI0ZW9YSXZ6
     X0txSGplckZybkRqbkdjR3JjVDlYOTM0MnQ2WEpNeS1VY1FXRUt6clVNCiAgRGE5S
     TFTUUljV0xESGIyQUJtTUZKZmFBIn19fX19",
         {
           "signatures":[{
               "alg":"S512",
               "kid":"MAN2-ANEE-HJR4-I4T2-PKID-AZ4K-ESR4",
               "signature":"CUZYibn1PlgpCZuoqiKFZT1AKXDFe3EEmuSaTKoo
     TRH86oVdEeYNcVgzzn7sjFvO0TqDUvGK6saAcRsKDjTharVnLx3TnVHRmofUN5iqK
     yu9RwwC16bdvsOV4W7j7OhHrjC41Drp-MPozT3bHfaG7j0A"}
             ],
           "PayloadDigest":"VHfvwZ_1GC1Q40Q1-Qv2rZatLkVyEiGTjZi7-JMN
     dJ7QGF7My1VdsepgSoSc1Gslm8fvFz2NlKMPA-LCxlPovg"}
         ],
       "EnvelopedConnectionService":[{
           "dig":"S512",
           "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
     9uU2VydmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICA
     iQ3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIzLTA2LTI4VDE3OjAwOjUwWiJ9"},
         "ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uU2VydmljZSI6IHsKICAgICJBdXRoZW50aWNhdG
     lvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNREY0LUNNQ1EtQktRWC0yUDZQLVAySzItMjd
     VRC03QUdSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1
     YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgI
     CAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJGOEI0ZW9YSXZ6X0txSGplckZybkRqbkdjR3JjVDlYOTM0Mn
     Q2WEpNeS1VY1FXRUt6clVNCiAgRGE5STFTUUljV0xESGIyQUJtTUZKZmFBIn19fX1
     9",
         {
           "signatures":[{
               "alg":"S512",
               "kid":"MAN2-ANEE-HJR4-I4T2-PKID-AZ4K-ESR4",
               "signature":"wYdQgPUrZcRuEvtZX55jZ-5aTnf5xN1TZ6pNHTD1
     0y3wlEXgKRP0KsMOLNRqZAo7eblK8NvsxVcAcQ9c8oWiqffZ6gDh1wH78XCreEeA_
     o62KkaYnN7rhcJ-4veoqc4Kz8du1xCRRjKDC0Wi7EqBfBsA"}



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             ],
           "PayloadDigest":"YyVytW08cXC2UlAnQgNVkhi6_2ab5Gmy90WzFzBG
     -bDKpzRgbiK2vuaQpVlIRdZ5PYVeeO1QtGnu877s08E3Yg"}
         ],
       "PrivateKey":{
         "PrivateKeyUDF":{
           "PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-BIPI-QZV3-UXRZ-TRIO-S5XC-GEOJ-GELH-TXM
   6-CBIN-QKF3-AWWC-HTOO-DJOG",
           "KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice"}},
       "ConnectUri":"mcu://maker@example.com/ECHI-CYLR-Y22Q-6OME-OAWV-
   WIQD-YM",
       "EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
           "EnvelopeId":"MBAI-IMKY-GI2T-D472-4VP5-SKRF-ZXYW",
           "dig":"S512",
           "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQkFJLUlNS1ktR0
     kyVC1ENDcyLTRWUDUtU0tSRi1aWFlXIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZml
     sZURldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAi
     Q3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIzLTA2LTI4VDE3OjAwOjUwWiJ9"},
         "ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkVuY3J5cHRpb24iOiB7Ci
     AgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTURGNC1DTUNRLUJLUVgtMlA2UC1QMksyLTI3VUQtN0FHUiI
     sCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNLZXlF
     Q0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJYNDQ4IiwKICAgICAgICAgICJQdWJsa
     WMiOiAiRjhCNGVvWEl2el9LcUhqZXJGcm5Eam5HY0dyY1Q5WDkzNDJ0NlhKTXktVW
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     nbmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1DUlAtN09RUC1MWkVHLUtESFQtV1RO
     US1KUzRBLVBHRlIiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAgI
     CAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogIC
     AgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJWMVB1LUVBMTlnVlQ4bmJsczJ5aDB5Q2Z1R0Q1VG9
     pSEd5ZjhzMGx2MEFJV2hxR0Q3OG9UCiAgcEZFMjNSTlNFV1ZzNC1YWC1ucHd6REVB
     In19fSwKICAgICJBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNQjNUL
     VlNTVYtV0FCVi1KM1lQLU9ZTEItWUFBSS1RRkQyIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1Bhcm
     FtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICA
     iY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJBQ2ptd2NMUVVlOGk1
     UnVZUEZPSFhCTHlYRkN6RVcyb0lkUHh5Wk9mYlN2SEI0WUlEOUhqCiAgMHRsM0lad
     lJQdjlUc25Pc2hpZWRlMDJBIn19fSwKICAgICJQcm9maWxlU2lnbmF0dXJlIjogew
     ogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1CQUktSU1LWS1HSTJULUQ0NzItNFZQNS1TS1JGLVpYWVc
     iLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5
     RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1Y
     mxpYyI6ICJkdTBFenhUdEZWa3BqWnphTi13LXBkRlFZMUpPWDRrQmlyX0pVUEdoQ3
     M3SzlELUpqTmV1CiAgNjdtMDcxR3AxSG9yZF9LeUJWSW8wWmtBIn19fX19",
         {
           "signatures":[{
               "alg":"S512",
               "kid":"MBAI-IMKY-GI2T-D472-4VP5-SKRF-ZXYW",
               "signature":"7ECNMccaM24RWFOoJJVU55zb1XfgLFisbc15VIVd
     B_k6xeVGmpchZtgVrdeDjHgpesIqgJmbB7yAdPoIEusSu8pgY_Oc6BjMARJYAS9YW
     bfE4UX2HBlWViyY7I2RUM0_VvcOgt6Fc3XMXCtvbsAG4gwA"}
             ],



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           "PayloadDigest":"xalDY6zOXjHmqlXWGKty0QkSsPfDQ5tuDHY-Tm8R
     e7UuxEfjvZnpTBtes9Etx86yn55D24AGSF199ejrRu8o5A"}
         ]}}

   The use of the publication mechanism in device connection is
   discussed further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

9.  Architecture

   The Mesh architecture has four principal components:

   Mesh Account  A collection of information (contacts, calendar
      entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) belonging to a user
      who uses the Mesh to management.

   Mesh Device Management  The various functions that manage binding of
      devices to a Mesh to grant access to information and services
      bound to that account.

   Mesh Service  Provides network services through which devices and
      other Mesh users may interact with a Mesh Account.

   Mesh Messaging  An end-to-end secure messaging service that allows
      short messages (less than 32KB) to be exchanged between Mesh
      Accounts and between the Mesh devices connected to a particular
      account.

   The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a
   key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications.
   A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh
   Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their
   choosing.

   A Mesh Account May be active or inactive.  By definition, an active
   Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive
   Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service.  A Mesh Service
   Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other
   providers.  In this case the backup provider is connected to the
   account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to
   maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and
   facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the
   account should that be desired.  The use of backup providers is
   described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery].








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9.1.  Mesh Account

   Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts,
   calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
   particular persona used by the owner.

   By definition a Mesh Account is active if it is serviced by a Mesh
   Service and inactive otherwise.  A Mesh user MAY change their service
   provider at any time.  An active Mesh Account is serviced by exactly
   one Mesh Service at once but a user MAY register a 'backup' service
   provider to their account in the same manner as adding an advice.
   This ensures that the backup service is pre-populated with all the
   information required to allow the user to switch to the new provider
   without interruption of service.

   Each Mesh account is described by an Account Profile.  Currently
   separate profile Account Profile are defined for user accounts and
   group accounts.  It is not clear if this distinction is a useful one.

9.1.1.  Account Profile

   A Mesh account profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user.
   It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration
   Signature Keys.  The unique identifier of the master profile is the
   UDF of the Master Signature Key.

   An Account Profile MUST specify an EscrowEncryption key.  This key
   MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored
   data.  They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST
   NOT be used to escrow signature keys.

   A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they
   intend to establish a separate identity.  To minimize the risk of
   disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign
   updates to the account profile itself.  This allows the user to
   secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware
   token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow
   mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document.

9.1.1.1.  Creating a ProfileMaster

   Creating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:

   0.  Creating a Master Signature key.

   1.  Creating an Online Signing Key

   2.  Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key



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   3.  Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
       CatalogHost.

   4.  (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and
       granting it the ActivationAdministration activation.

9.1.1.2.  Updating a ProfileMaster

   Updating a ProfileMaster comprises the steps of:

   0.  Making the necessary changes.

   1.  Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key

   2.  Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
       CatalogHost.

9.2.  Device Management

   Device management allows a collection of devices belonging to a user
   to function as a single personal Mesh.  Two catalogs are used to
   manage this process:

   *  The Access catalog is used to instruct the Mesh Service how to
      respond to requests from the device.

   *  The Device catalog records information for use by administration
      devices managing the device.

9.2.1.  The Device Catalog

   Each Mesh Account has a Device Catalog CatalogDevice associated with
   it.  The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of devices
   to the Personal Mesh and has a CatalogEntryDevice for each device
   currently connected to the catalog.

   Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up-to-date copy of
   the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the
   Mesh.  The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the
   Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there
   is more than one administration device.

   The CatalogEntryDevice contains fields for the device profile, device
   private and device connection.







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9.2.2.  Mesh Devices

   The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the
   possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture.
   Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration
   device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put
   our full trust in either the device being connected or the
   administration device connecting it.

   This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material
   generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the
   context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully
   verified by both parties.

   Additional keying material sources could be added if protection
   against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required
   but this is not supported by the current specifications.

   A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key
   contributions of the device.  When bound to an account, the base keys
   specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data
   provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device
   will use in the context of the account.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

      Figure 2: Mapping of Device Profile and Device Private to Device
                              Connection Keys.

   Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require
   more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by
   multiple users under different accounts.  But a device MAY have
   multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for
   implementation.

9.2.2.1.  Creating a ProfileDevice

   Creating a ProfileDevice comprises the steps of:

   0.  Creating the necessary key

   1.  Signing the ProfileDevice using the Master Signature Key

   2.  Once created, a ProfileDevice is never changed.  In the unlikely
       event that any modification is required, a completely new
       ProfileDevice MUST be created.




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9.2.2.2.  Connection to a Meh Account

   Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by an administration
   device.  This comprises the steps of:

   0.  Generating the PrivateDevice keys.

   1.  Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of
       the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the
       administration key.

   2.  Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using
       the administration key.

   3.  Creating the CatalogEntryDevice for the device and adding it to
       the CatalogDevice of the account.

   4.  Creating an AccessCapability granting the necessary access rights
       for the device and adding that to the CatalogAccess of the
       account.

   These steps are usually performed through use of the Mesh Protocol
   Connection mechanism.  However, Mesh clients MAY support additional
   mechanisms as circumstances require provided that the appropriate
   authentication and private key protection controls are provided.

9.3.  Mesh Services

   A Mesh Service provides one or more Mesh Hosts that support Mesh
   Accounts through the Mesh Web Service Protocol.

   Mesh Services and Hosts are described by Service Profiles and Host
   Profiles.  The means by which services manage the hosts through which
   they provide service is outside the scope of this document.

   As with a Device connected to a Mesh Account, a the binding of a Host
   to the service it supports is described by a connection record:

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

          Figure 3: Service Profile and Delegated Host Assertion.

   The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are
   distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services
   TLS requests.  WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and
   authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication.




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   Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need
   to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its
   identity.  Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third
   Parties to establish accountability.

9.4.  Mesh Messaging

   Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to
   exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services.  In
   cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging
   MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message
   recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of
   retrieval (e.g an EARL).

   All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh
   Message carried in a Dare Envelope.  Mesh Messages are stored in two
   spools associated with the account, the SpoolOutbound and the
   SpoolInbound containing the messages sent and received respectively.

   This document only describes the representation of the messages
   within the message spool.  The Mesh Service protocol by which the
   messages are exchanged between devices and services and between
   services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

9.4.1.  Message Status

   As previously described in section ###, every message stored in a
   spool has a specified state.  The range of allowable states is
   defined by the message type.  New message states MAY be defined for
   new message types as they are defined.

   By default, messages are appended to a spool in the Initial state,
   but a spool entry MAY specify any state that is valid for that
   message type.

   The state of a message is changed by appending a completion message
   to the spool as described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

   Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site
   policy.  Since messages are not removed from the spool on being
   marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or
   unread.  Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the
   message will be removed if the sequence is subsequently purged.








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9.4.2.  Four Corner Model

   A four-corner messaging model is enforced.  Mesh Services only accept
   outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it
   services.  Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh
   Services.  This model enables access control at both the outbound and
   inbound services

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

                   Figure 4: Four Corner Messaging Model

   The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a
   message does not violate its acceptable use policy.  Accounts that
   make a large number of message requests that result in complaints
   SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the
   number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating
   messaging privileges.  Services that fail to implement appropriate
   controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their
   users or from other services.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

          Figure 5: Performing Access Control on Outbound Messages

   The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received
   are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's
   personal access control settings.

   Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders
   SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account
   holders.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-12.html for artwork.)

          Figure 6: Performing Access Control on Inbound Messages

9.4.3.  Traffic Analysis

   The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only
   limited protection against traffic analysis attacks.  The use of TLS
   to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the
   effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not
   prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to
   obfuscate traffic flows.



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   The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate
   use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic
   analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh
   Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and
   there are no immediate plans to do so.

10.  Publications

   Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device
   connection.  In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing
   the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published
   data.

   The use of EARLs as a means of publishing encrypted data and the use
   of EARLs for location, decryption and authentication is discussed in
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] .

10.1.  Profile Device

10.2.  Contact Exchange

   When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a
   CatalogedContact record.

   Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business
   card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal
   property to facilitate return of lost property.

11.  Schema

11.1.  Shared Classes

   The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
   specifications.

11.1.1.  Classes describing keys

11.1.2.  Structure: KeyData

   The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
   assertions associated with a public key.

   Udf: String (Optional)  UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters

   X509Certificate: Binary (Optional)  List of X.509 Certificates

   X509Chain: Binary [0..Many]  X.509 Certificate chain.




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   X509CSR: Binary (Optional)  X.509 Certificate Signing Request.

   NotBefore: DateTime (Optional)  If present specifies a time instant
      that use of the private key is not valid before.

   NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional)  If present specifies a time
      instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.

11.1.3.  Structure: KeyShare

   Inherits: Key

   ServiceId: String (Optional)  The identifier used to claim the
      capability from the service.[Only present for a partial key.]

   ServiceAddress: String (Optional)  The service account that supports
      a serviced capability.  [Only present for a partial key.]

11.1.4.  Structure: CompositePrivate

   Inherits: Key

   DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional)  UDF fingerprint of the bound device
      key (if used).

11.2.  Assertion classes

   Classes that are derived from an assertion.

11.2.1.  Structure: Assertion

   Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived

   Names: String [0..Many]  Fingerprints of index terms for profile
      retrieval.  The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
      name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
      forms of abuse.

   Updated: DateTime (Optional)  The time instant the profile was last
      modified.

   NotaryToken: String (Optional)  A Uniform Notary Token providing
      evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
      created.







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11.2.2.  Structure: Condition

   Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.

   [No fields]

11.2.3.  Base Classes

   Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
   classes are derrived.

11.2.4.  Structure: Activation

   Inherits: Assertion

   Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
   running on a specific device

   ActivationKey: String (Optional)  Secret seed used to derive keys
      that are not explicitly specified.

   Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many]  Activation of named account
      resource activations.  These are separate from Application
      activations which are

11.2.5.  Structure: ActivationEntry

   Resource: String (Optional)  Name of the activated resource

   Key: KeyData (Optional)  The activation key or key share

   ServiceId: String (Optional)  The identifier used to claim the
      capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
      capability.]

   ServiceAddress: String (Optional)  The service account that supports
      a serviced capability.  [Only present for a partial capability.]

11.2.6.  Mesh Profile Classes

   Classes describing Mesh Profiles.  All Profiles are Assertions
   derrived from Assertion.

11.2.7.  Structure: Profile

   Inherits: Assertion

   Parent class from which all profile classes are derived



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   Description: String (Optional)  Description of the profile

   ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional)  The permanent signature key
      used to sign the profile itself.  The UDF of the key is used as
      the permanent object identifier of the profile.  Thus, by
      definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
      under any circumstance.

11.2.8.  Structure: ProfileDevice

   Inherits: Profile

   Describes a mesh device.

   Encryption: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for encryption
      keys.  Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the device
      during connection to an account.

   Signature: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for signature
      keys.

   Authentication: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for
      authentication keys.  Also used to authenticate the device during
      connection to an account.

11.2.9.  Structure: ProfileAccount

   Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup.
   These subclasses may be merged at some future date.

   Inherits: Profile

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)  The account address.  This is
      either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh
      Name (@alice).

   ServiceUdf: String (Optional)  The fingerprint of the service profile
      to which the account is currently bound.

   EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Escrow key associated with the
      account.

   AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign
      connection assertions to the account.

   CommonEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key currently used to encrypt
      data under this profile




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   CommonAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      requests made under this user account.  This key SHOULD NOT be
      provisioned to any device except for the purpose of enabling
      account recovery.

11.2.10.  Structure: ProfileUser

   Inherits: ProfileAccount

   Account assertion.  This is signed by the service hosting the
   account.

   CommonSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign data under the
      account.

11.2.11.  Structure: ProfileGroup

   Inherits: ProfileAccount

   Describes a group.  Note that while a group is created by one person
   who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
   other administrators over time.

   Cover: Binary (Optional)  HTML document containing cover text to be
      presented if a document encrypted under the group key cannot be
      decrypted.

11.2.12.  Structure: ProfileService

   Inherits: Profile

   Profile of a Mesh Service

   ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      service connections.

   ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to encrypt data under
      this profile

   ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign data under the
      account.

11.2.13.  Structure: ProfileMeshService

   Inherits: ProfileService

   Profile of a Mesh Service




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   [No fields]

11.2.14.  Structure: ProfileHost

   Inherits: ProfileDevice

   Profile of a Mesh Host providing one or more Mesh Services.

   [No fields]

11.2.15.  Connection Assertions

   Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize
   interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the
   account.  They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.

11.2.16.  Structure: Connection

   Inherits: Assertion

   Subject: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection target.

   Authority: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection source.

   Authentication: KeyData (Optional)  The authentication key for use of
      the device under the profile

11.2.17.  Structure: CallsignBinding

   Inherits: Assertion

   Canonical: String (Optional)  The canonical form of the callsign.

   Display: String (Optional)  The display form of the callsign.  This
      MAY include characters such as whitespace, trademark signifiers,
      etc. that are omitted of trranslated in the canonical form.

   CharacterPage: String (Optional)  Specifies the page to which the
      Description"CharacterPageLatin"

   ProfileUdf: String (Optional)  The profile to which the name is
      bound.

   TransferUdf: String (Optional)  The profile to which the name has
      been transfered.

   Services: NamedService [0..Many]  List of named services.  If




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      multiple service providers are specified for a given service,
      these are listed in order of priority, most preferred first.

   ServiceAddress: String (Optional)  The Mesh service address.

   CommonEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key currently used to encrypt
      data under this profile

11.2.18.  Structure: Accreditation

   Registration of a trusted third party accreditation of a callsign/
   profile binding.

   Callsign: String (Optional)  The callsign to which the accreditation
      applies

   ProfileUdf: String (Optional)  The profile to which the accreditation
      applies.

   SubjectNames: String [0..Many]  The validated names of the subject

   SubjectLogos: String [0..Many]  Mesh strong URIs from which a
      validated logo belonging to the subject MAY be retreived and
      validated.

   Issued: DateTime (Optional)  The time the assertion was issued.

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)  The time the assertion is due to expire

   Policy: String (Optional)  The issuing policy under which the
      validation was performed.

   Practice: String (Optional)  The issuing practices under which the
      validation was performed.

11.2.19.  Structure: ConnectionStripped

   Asserts that a profile is connected to an account address.

   Inherits: Connection

   Stripped down connection assertion

   Account: String (Optional)  To be removed







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11.2.20.  Structure: ConnectionService

   Inherits: Connection

   Asserts that a device is connected to an account profile

   ProfileUdf: String (Optional)  The account address

11.2.21.  Structure: ConnectionDevice

   Inherits: ConnectionService

   Asserts that a device is connected to an account profile

   Roles: String [0..Many]

   Signature: KeyData (Optional)  The signature key for use of the
      device under the profile

   Encryption: KeyData (Optional)  The encryption key for use of the
      device under the profile

11.2.22.  Structure: ConnectionApplication

   Inherits: Connection

   Connection assertion stating that a particular device is

   [No fields]

11.2.23.  Structure: ConnectionGroup

   Describes the connection of a member to a group.

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

11.2.24.  Structure: AccountHostAssignment

   Inherits: Assertion

   AccountAddess: String (Optional)  The account being bound

   HostAddresses: String [0..Many]  Host address in Callsign, DNS or IP
      format in order of preference.

   AccessEncrypt: KeyData (Optional)  Encryption key to be used to



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      encrypt data for the service to use.

   CallsignServiceProfile: ProfileAccount (Optional)  Profile of the
      callsign registry used by the service.

11.2.25.  Structure: ConnectionHost

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

11.2.26.  Activation Assertions

11.2.27.  Structure: ActivationAccount

   Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
   of a Mesh account.

   Inherits: Activation

   AccountUdf: String (Optional)  The UDF of the account

11.2.28.  Structure: ActivationHost

   Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
   of a Mesh host

   Inherits: ActivationAccount

   [No fields]

11.2.29.  Structure: ActivationCommon

   Inherits: Activation

   ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to profile online
      signing key used to sign updates to the profile.

   AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to Profile
      administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.

   Encryption: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to ProfileUser account
      encryption key

   Authentication: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to ProfileUser
      account authentication key

   Signature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to ProfileUser account



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      signature key

11.2.30.  Structure: ActivationApplication

   Inherits: Activation

   [No fields]

11.2.31.  Structure: ActivationApplicationSsh

   Inherits: ActivationApplication

   ClientKey: KeyData (Optional)  The SSH client key.

11.2.32.  Structure: ActivationApplicationMail

   Inherits: ActivationApplication

   SmimeSign: KeyData (Optional)  The S/Mime signature key

   SmimeEncrypt: KeyData (Optional)  The S/Mime encryption key

   OpenpgpSign: KeyData (Optional)  The OpenPGP signature key

   OpenpgpEncrypt: KeyData (Optional)  The OpenPGP encryption key

11.2.33.  Structure: ActivationApplicationGroup

   Inherits: ActivationApplication

   AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key or capability allowing
      account encryption keys to be created for new members.

   AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key or capability
      allowing account updates, connection assertions etc to be signed.

   AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key or capability allowing
      administration of the group.

   EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional)  Signed connection
      service delegation allowing the device to access the account.

11.3.  Application Data

11.3.1.  Structure: ApplicationEntry

   Identifier: String (Optional)




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11.3.2.  Structure: ApplicationEntrySsh

   Inherits: ApplicationEntry

   EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)

11.3.3.  Structure: ApplicationEntryGroup

   Inherits: ApplicationEntry

   EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)

11.3.4.  Structure: ApplicationEntryMail

   Inherits: ApplicationEntry

   EnvelopedActivation: Enveloped (Optional)

11.4.  Data Structures

   Classes describing data used in cataloged data.

11.4.1.  Structure: Contact

   Inherits: Assertion

   Base class for contact entries.

   Id: String (Optional)  The globally unique contact identifier.

   Local: String (Optional)  The local name.

   Anchors: Anchor [0..Many]  Mesh fingerprints associated with the
      contact.

   NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many]  Network address entries

   Locations: Location [0..Many]  The physical locations the contact is
      associated with.

   Roles: Role [0..Many]  The roles of the contact

   Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many]  The Web sites and other online
      presences of the contact

   Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many]  Source(s) from which this contact
      was constructed.




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11.4.2.  Structure: Anchor

   Trust anchor

   Udf: String (Optional)  The trust anchor.

   Validation: String (Optional)  The means of validation.

11.4.3.  Structure: TaggedSource

   Source from which contact information was obtained.

   LocalName: String (Optional)  Short name for the contact information.

   Validation: String (Optional)  The means of validation.

   BinarySource: Binary (Optional)  The contact data in binary form.

   EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional)  The contact data in enveloped
      form.  If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.

11.4.4.  Structure: ContactGroup

   Inherits: Contact

   Contact for a group, including encryption groups.

   [No fields]

11.4.5.  Structure: ContactPerson

   Inherits: Contact

   CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many]  List of person names in order of
      preference

11.4.6.  Structure: ContactOrganization

   Inherits: Contact

   CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many]  List of person names in
      order of preference

11.4.7.  Structure: OrganizationName

   The name of an organization

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current



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      use.

   RegisteredName: String (Optional)  The registered name.

   DBA: String (Optional)  Names that the organization uses including
      trading names and doing business as names.

11.4.8.  Structure: PersonName

   The name of a natural person

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current
      use.

   FullName: String (Optional)  The preferred presentation of the full
      name.

   Prefix: String (Optional)  Honorific or title, E.g.  Sir, Lord, Dr.,
      Mr.

   First: String (Optional)  First name.

   Middle: String [0..Many]  Middle names or initials.

   Last: String (Optional)  Last name.

   Suffix: String (Optional)  Nominal suffix, e.g.  Jr., III, etc.

   PostNominal: String (Optional)  Post nominal letters (if used).

11.4.9.  Structure: NetworkAddress

   Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
   particular network address

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current
      use.

   Address: String (Optional)  The network address, e.g.
      alice@example.com

   NetworkCapability: String [0..Many]  The capabilities bound to this
      address.

   EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional)  The account profile

   Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many]  Public keys associated with the
      network address



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11.4.10.  Structure: NetworkProtocol

   Protocol: String (Optional)  The IANA protocol|identifier of the
      network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
      specified Address.

11.4.11.  Structure: Role

   OrganizationName: String (Optional)  The organization at which the
      role is held

   Titles: String [0..Many]  The titles held with respect to that
      organization.

   Locations: Location [0..Many]  Postal or physical addresses
      associated with the role.

11.4.12.  Structure: Location

   Appartment: String (Optional)

   Street: String (Optional)

   District: String (Optional)

   Locality: String (Optional)

   County: String (Optional)

   Postcode: String (Optional)

   Country: String (Optional)

11.4.13.  Structure: Bookmark

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Role: String [0..Many]

11.4.14.  Structure: Reference

   MessageId: String (Optional)  The received message to which this is a
      response

   ResponseId: String (Optional)  Message that was generated in response
      to the original (optional).



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   Relationship: String (Optional)  The relationship type.  This can be
      Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.

11.4.15.  Structure: Engagement

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Start: DateTime (Optional)

   Finish: DateTime (Optional)

   StartTravel: String (Optional)

   FinishTravel: String (Optional)

   TimeZone: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Description: String (Optional)

   Location: String (Optional)

   Trigger: String [0..Many]

   Conference: String [0..Many]

   Repeat: String (Optional)

   Busy: Boolean (Optional)

11.5.  Catalog Entries

11.5.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry

   Base class for cataloged Mesh data.

   Labels: String [0..Many]  The set of labels describing the entry

   LocalName: String (Optional)  User specified identifier.

   Uid: String (Optional)  Globaly unique identifier

11.5.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello



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   Updated: DateTime (Optional)  Timestamp, allows

   Udf: String (Optional)  UDF of the signature key of the device in the
      Mesh

   DeviceUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the offline signature key of the
      device

   SignatureUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the account online signature
      key

   EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional)  The Mesh profile.  Why is
      this still here?  This is not specific to the device.

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device profile

   EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional)  Slim version of
      ConnectionDevice used by the presentation layer

   EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The public assertion
      demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh

   EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

   EnvelopedActivationCommon: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

11.5.3.  Structure: CatalogedSignature

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Cataloged Signature

   [No fields]

11.5.4.  Structure: CatalogedPublication

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   A publication.

   Id: String (Optional)  Unique identifier code

   Authenticator: String (Optional)  The witness key value to use to
      request access to the record.

   EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Dare Envelope containing the



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      entry data.  The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.

   NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional)  Epiration time (inclusive)

11.5.5.  Structure: CatalogedCredential

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Password: String (Optional)

   ClientAuthentication: KeyData [0..Many]  Specifies the client
      identification key

   HostAuthentication: KeyData [0..Many]  Means of authenticating the
      host key

11.5.6.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationSsh

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   ClientKey: KeyData (Optional)  The S/Mime encryption key

11.5.7.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Password: String (Optional)

11.5.8.  Structure: CatalogedContact

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Self: Boolean (Optional)  If true, this catalog entry is for the user
      who created the catalog.



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11.5.9.  Structure: CatalogedAccess

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   [No fields]

11.5.10.  Structure: Capability

   Id: String (Optional)  The identifier of the capability.  If this is
      a cryptographic capability, this is the KeyIdentifier of the
      primary key that was shared.  If this is an access capability,
      this is the KeyIdentifier of the authentication key being
      authorized for access.

   Active: Boolean (Optional)

   Issued: Integer (Optional)

   Mode: String (Optional)  The authentication mode: Device, Account,
      PIN

   Udf: String (Optional)  Identifies the authentication credential.
      For a device, this is the authentication key identifier, for an
      account, the profile identifier, for a PIN, the locator value of
      the PIN.

   Witness: String (Optional)  The verification value used to perform
      proof of knowledge of the secret.

11.5.11.  Structure: NullCapability

   Inherits: Capability

   [No fields]

11.5.12.  Structure: AccessCapability

   Inherits: Capability

   Rights: String [0..Many]  Access rights associated with the key

   EnvelopedCatalogedDevice: Enveloped (Optional)

   CatalogedDeviceDigest: String (Optional)  Digest value used to signal
      updates to envelope






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11.5.13.  Structure: PublicationCapability

   Inherits: Capability

   Identifier: String (Optional)  Selector allowing a specific document
      to be requested.

   Digest: String (Optional)  Document digest, this allows a status/
      claim request to request an update to be returned only if the
      document has changed.

   Data: Binary (Optional)  The published document.

11.5.14.  Structure: CryptographicCapability

   Inherits: Capability

   KeyData: KeyData (Optional)  The key that enables the capability

   GranteeAccount: String (Optional)

   GranteeUdf: String (Optional)

   EnvelopedKeyShare: Enveloped (Optional)  One or more enveloped key
      shares.

11.5.15.  Structure: CapabilityDecrypt

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a decryption key

   [No fields]

11.5.16.  Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial

   Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt

   The corresponding key is an encryption key

   [No fields]

11.5.17.  Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced

   Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt

   The corresponding key is an encryption key




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   AuthenticationId: String (Optional)  UDF of trust root under which
      request to use a serviced capability must be authorized.  [Only
      present for a serviced capability]

11.5.18.  Structure: CapabilitySign

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is an administration key

   [No fields]

11.5.19.  Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
   shares.

   [No fields]

11.5.20.  Structure: CapabilityFairExchange

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
   with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
   Parties protocol.

   [No fields]

11.5.21.  Structure: NamedService

   Prefix: String (Optional)  The IANA service name (e.g. dns)

   Mapping: String (Optional)  Optional name mapping, (e.g.
      alice@example.com -> alice.mesh)

   Endpoints: String [0..Many]  The service endpoints.  This MAY be
      specified as a callsign (@alice), a DNS address (example.com), an
      IP address (10.0.0.1) or a fully qualified URI.

11.5.22.  Structure: ServiceAccessToken

   Inherits: NamedService

   Token: Binary (Optional)  Session initiation token




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   SharedSecret: Binary (Optional)  Session shared secret

11.5.23.  Structure: CatalogedBookmark

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Comments: String [0..Many]  User comments on bookmark entry

11.5.24.  Structure: CatalogedTask

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

11.5.25.  Structure: CatalogedApplication

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Default: Integer (Optional)

   Key: String (Optional)

   Grant: String [0..Many]

   Deny: String [0..Many]

   EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many]  Enveloped keys for use
      with Application

   EnvelopedEscrow: Enveloped [0..Many]  Escrow entries for the
      application.

11.5.26.  Structure: CatalogedMember

   ContactAddress: String (Optional)

   MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)

   ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)




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   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

11.5.27.  Structure: CatalogedGroup

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   EnvelopedConnectionAddress: Enveloped (Optional)  The connection
      allowing control of the group.

   EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional)  The Mesh profile

   EnvelopedActivationCommon: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

11.5.28.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)

   InboundConnect: String (Optional)

   OutboundConnect: String (Optional)

   SmimeSign: KeyData (Optional)  The S/Mime signature key

   SmimeEncrypt: KeyData (Optional)  The S/Mime encryption key

   OpenpgpSign: KeyData (Optional)  The OpenPGP signature key

   OpenpgpEncrypt: KeyData (Optional)  The OpenPGP encryption key

11.5.29.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

11.5.30.  Structure: MessageInvoice

   Inherits: Message

   [No fields]

11.5.31.  Structure: CatalogedReceipt

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry




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   [No fields]

11.5.32.  Structure: CatalogedTicket

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   [No fields]

11.6.  Publications

11.6.1.  Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPublic

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device profile

   Hailing: String [0..Many]  A list of URIs specifying hailing
      transports that may be used to initiate a connection to the
      device.  This allows a device to specify that it can be reached by
      WiFi transport to a particular private SSID, or by Bluetooth, IR
      etc. etc.

11.6.2.  Structure: DevicePreconfigurationPrivate

   Inherits: DevicePreconfigurationPublic

   A data structure that is passed

   EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device
      connection

   EnvelopedConnectionService: Enveloped (Optional)  The device
      connection

   ConnectUri: String (Optional)  The connection URI.  This would
      normally be printed on the device as a QR code.

11.7.  Messages

11.7.1.  Structure: Message

   MessageId: String (Optional)  Unique per-message ID.  When
      encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
      EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.

   Sender: String (Optional)

   Recipient: String (Optional)





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11.7.2.  Structure: MessageError

   Inherits: Message

   ErrorCode: String (Optional)

11.7.3.  Structure: MessageComplete

   Inherits: Message

   References: Reference [0..Many]

11.7.4.  Structure: MessageValidated

   Inherits: Message

   AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Enveloped data that is
      authenticated by means of the PIN

   ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)  Nonce provided by the client to
      validate the PIN

   PinId: String (Optional)  Pin identifier value calculated from the
      PIN code, action and account address.

   PinWitness: Binary (Optional)  Witness value calculated as KDF
      (Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)

11.7.5.  Structure: MessagePin

   Account: String (Optional)

   Inherits: Message

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

   Automatic: Boolean (Optional)  If true, authentication against the
      PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
      further authorization.

   SaltedPin: String (Optional)  PIN code bound to the specified action.

   Action: String (Optional)  The action to which this PIN code is
      bound.

   Roles: String [0..Many]  The set of rights bound to the PIN grant.





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11.7.6.  Structure: RequestConnection

   Connection request message.  This message contains the information

   Inherits: MessageValidated

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)

11.7.7.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection

   Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
   valid MessageConnectionRequestClient

   Inherits: Message

   EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional)  The client
      connection request.

   ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)

   Witness: String (Optional)

11.7.8.  Structure: RespondConnection

   Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
   connection request.

   Inherits: Message

   Result: String (Optional)  The response to the request.  One of
      "Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".

   CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional)  The device information.
      MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept".  MUST be
      absent or null otherwise.

11.7.9.  Structure: MessageContact

   Inherits: MessageValidated

   Reply: Boolean (Optional)  If true, requests that the recipient
      return their own contact information in reply.

   Subject: String (Optional)  Optional explanation of the reason for
      the request.

   PIN: String (Optional)  One time authentication code supplied to a
      recipient to allow authentication of the response.



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11.7.10.  Structure: GroupInvitation

   Inherits: Message

   Text: String (Optional)

11.7.11.  Structure: RequestConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Text: String (Optional)

11.7.12.  Structure: ResponseConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Request: Enveloped (Optional)

   Accept: Boolean (Optional)

11.7.13.  Structure: RequestTask

   Inherits: Message

   [No fields]

11.7.14.  Structure: MessageClaim

   Inherits: Message

   PublicationId: String (Optional)

   ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)

   DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

11.7.15.  Structure: ProcessResult

   Report result of message processing.

   Inherits: Message

   Success: Boolean (Optional)

   ErrorReport: String (Optional)  The error report code.




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11.7.16.  Structure: ProcessResultNotSupported

   The message type is not supported.

   Inherits: ProcessResult

   [No fields]

11.7.17.  Structure: ProcessResultNotFound

   Inherits: ProcessResult

   [No fields]

12.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
   services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
   Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].

13.  IANA Considerations

   All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
   this document

14.  Acknowledgements

   A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
   presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

15.  Normative References

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
              Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-21, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-architecture-21>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Mesh
              Callsign Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-callsign-02, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-callsign-02>.






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   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data
              At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-16, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-dare-16>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: Mesh
              Discovery Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery-01, 13 January 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-discovery-01>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
              Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-protocol-14, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-protocol-14>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IX Security
              Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-security-09, 20 April 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-security-09>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
              Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-17, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-udf-17>.

   [draft-hallambaker-threshold]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
              threshold-08, 23 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              threshold-08>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

16.  Informative References



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   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
              Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hallambaker-
              mesh-developer-10>.

   [draft-irtf-cfrg-frost]
              Connolly, D., Komlo, C., Goldberg, I., and C. A. Wood,
              "Two-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures with FROST", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-frost-13, 8
              May 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              irtf-cfrg-frost-13>.

   [draft-komlo-frost]
              Komlo, C. and I. Goldberg, "FROST: Flexible Round-
              Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-komlo-frost-00, 7 August 2020,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-komlo-frost-
              00>.

   [RFC2426]  Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
              RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2426>.

   [RFC5545]  Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling
              Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5545>.






















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